Chairman Kerry and Ranking Member Lugar

and other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I

really do appreciate this opportunity to come here this morning to

discuss the situation and to answer your questions about the difficult

challenges that lie ahead.

The issues we face today, as you know, are very complex, and the

time is very, very short. And the next months, as you pointed out

so clearly, are so critical, as we strive to increase security and stability,

peace and prosperity in Sudan.

I’d like to just take a few minutes to just say a little bit about

what’s happened in the last 14 months. The recent rapprochement

between Chad and Sudan has gone a long way to ending the proxy

war that was such a devastating situation. Our team has played

an integral role in unifying the rebel movements. And we hope that

the peace talks will resume again, later this month, in Doha, to formalize

the peace deal and get that cease-fire moving ahead.

Looking ahead, as you rightly point out, Darfur will continue to

be a priority. And we’re working with the Government of Sudan,

the Africa Union, the United Nations to end the remaining

conflicts.

Beyond the political talks, our objective remains to increase security

and stability at the local level, at the individual level. And

we’re helping to negotiate agreements on power-sharing, wealth sharing,

land reform, compensation, local justice, and the accountability

mechanisms.

Recently, as you know, the Sudan held its first multiparty elections

in 24 years, and we’ve consistently echoed the concerns

expressed by the international observer missions about the

logistical challenges, the violations of civil liberties, the harassment

of opposition groups, and the ongoing problems that we’re facing

right now in the tabulation phase. But, these observer groups have

also stated that the elections fulfilled a critical milestone of the

CPA; they ushered in a renewed civic engagement across the country.

Over 16,000 candidates from 72 different political parties ran

for executive offices and the 1,841 legislative seats. And 25 percent

of those will be filled by women. Nearly 80 percent of Sudan’s eligible

voters registered, and over 10 million Sudanese inked their fingers

as they cast their votes.

The elections represent an important first step in increasing the

political space, and an initial movement toward the democratic

transformation, both the North and the South.

As we anticipate the end of the CPA in 2011, there are several

more important issues that have to be resolved this year. And

among them are preparing for the referenda in Abyei in Southern

Sudan; conducting popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and

the Blue Nile; and finalizing the demarcation of the borders in

North and South and also in Abyei. And, of course, we’re going to

have to negotiate those critical post-CPA agreements.

As you mentioned, I just returned from a series of meetings in

Addis, and while there, we met with representatives of the parties,

senior leaders from the African Union, the United Nations, and

other partners who are interested in Sudan. And together we’re

assembling a strong team of international regional stakeholders to

implement the remaining CPA milestones to support these negotiations

that have to take place about post-CPA issues, and to

advance the vital programs in Darfur.

We must never forget, though, that it’s really this NCP and the

SPLM who are really the only essential parties to the negotiations.

And we must continue to help them to work together, and make

that our top priority.

I want to reiterate our unequivocal commitment to fully implementing

the CPA. We must ensure that the southerners and residents

of Abyei get an opportunity to vote in the referenda. And

whether the South chooses unity or secession, it’s imperative that

the international community work now to ensure that the Government

of Southern Sudan has the increased capacity to govern effectively,

to provide security, and to deliver public services to its people.

To achieve this, a robust and concerted international effort will

be required.

And on our part, the United States has already begun to expand

its presence in the South. In the next month, we’ll be sending a

senior diplomat with experience in the region to lead our efforts on

the ground. The United States Government and its growing team

of international partners are increasingly well postured to respond

to the many challenges and opportunities in Sudan.

And with that, I look forward to your questions.

Chairman Kerry, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I am honored

by the opportunity to discuss with you today the situation in Sudan and the

important challenges that lie ahead. As you noted in your invitation to testify, the

coming months clearly bring a series of critical decision points for policymakers in

Khartoum, Juba, neighboring capitals, and here in Washington as well. I will focus

my remarks today primarily on the road to the referenda in January 2011, the post-

2011 planning and capacity-building that need to continue at an accelerated pace,

and issues of peace, accountability, and security for Darfur.

Prior to January 2011 there are a number of tasks to be undertaken in a short

time period. The United States and the international community in general must

be prepared to assist the parties in this endeavor to help maintain peace and stability

in Sudan and the region. Before we look ahead, though, it’s important to take

a moment to take stock of some of the most important recent developments.

Chad and Sudan have made notable progress in their bilateral relationship,

moving toward stopping the long-running proxy war among rebels from both

states and ending support to the rebels, deploying a joint border monitoring

force, and opening the border between the two countries on April 14.

Peace talks under the auspices of the U.N. and African Union in Doha have resulted

in unification of some Darfur rebels into two groups and involved civil

society in preparations for negotiations. However, the Darfur rebel leader with

the most popular support among the Fur, Abdul Wahid, has refused to participate

in the talks. The Justice and Equality Movement—the most militarily significant

rebel group in Darfur—last week suspended its participation in the

talks amid new reports of clashes with government forces in Darfur.

In April, Sudan held its first multiparty elections in 24 years in a largely peaceful

manner. We share the serious concerns expressed by the Carter Center, the

European Union, and other organizations that undertook election observation

missions about widespread logistical and administrative challenges and procedural

irregularities, restrictions on civil liberties, some cases of fraud, harassment

by military and security services, and that the ongoing conflict in Darfur

did not permit an environment conducive to elections. We also have concerns

about the tabulation process. As these observation missions have also noted, the

elections failed to meet international standards. There were some positive outcomes

from these elections, in addition to fulfilling a Comprehensive Peace

Agreement (CPA) milestone. Dozens of registered parties and thousands of candidates

participated, and over 10 million votes were cast, according to the National

Elections Commission. The elections period also saw renewed engagement

by civil society groups and increased civic participation among the populace.

We cannot ignore the challenges that continue to exist, and there is daunting

work ahead. There are less than 8 months remaining until the referenda. Before

those votes take place, there are important issues in the CPA that must be resolved,

including:

North/South Border Demarcation: Earlier this year the parties approved a report

detailing undisputed areas of the North/South border, but they need to agree

on remaining disputed areas and urgently begin demarcation.

Southern Sudan Referendum Preparations: The parties must finalize composition

of the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission, to be approved by the newly

formed National Assembly, and these bodies must immediately create plans to undertake

voter registration and develop voting procedures within a very tight

timeline.

Abyei Referendum Preparations: In addition to finalizing the composition of the

Abyei Referendum Commission that must create similar plans, the parties must also

resolve sensitive questions around who is eligible to vote in Abyei. The Abyei boundary

must also be demarcated.

Popular Consultations for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile: Technical committees

have begun planning, but commissions to be created from newly elected state

assemblies will undertake the actual consultations. Postponed state-level elections

in Southern Kordofan must first take place before this state’s commission can be

formed.

The above issues are complex and it is clear that time is limited. The NCP and

SPLM must work together in an atmosphere of open dialogue and trust, consulting

with other Sudanese stakeholders as necessary to ensure broad support. These CPA

issues recently took a back seat to electoral preparations, but now the parties must

refocus and intensify their implementation efforts. Both the government in Khartoum

and the Government of Southern Sudan are in the process of reallocating positions

based on electoral results. In the coming weeks following the elections, they

will need to quickly appoint credible ministries and institutions that are able to

gather support for the tough decisions that lay ahead.

As we look to the referenda, which are stipulated by the CPA and enshrined in

the Interim Constitution of Sudan, we have carefully considered possible scenarios

for which the international community should be prepared. The scenario we’d like

to see is outlined in the CPA: credible and peaceful referenda are undertaken during

which Southern Sudanese choose unity or secession, and the people of Abyei choose

whether to remain with the North or join the South. In this scenario the outcomes

are respected by the National Congress Party (NCP), the Sudan People’s Liberation

Movement (SPLM), other political parties and Sudanese citizens, as well as the

international community, including those who signed on to the CPA as witnesses

and supporters of implementation of the CPA in 2005. We must also be prepared

to respond to less favorable scenarios.

We are mindful that the end of the Interim Period will change the relationship

between the north and south, regardless of the outcome of the two referenda. We

continue to strongly encourage the parties to formalize a framework for negotiations

on post-CPA issues. The critical issues for agreement will include: citizenship, management

of natural resources such as oil and water, the status of transboundary migratory

populations, security arrangements, and assets and liabilities. Agreement on

such issues is necessary both to inform the choices of voters and to ensure a smooth

post-2011 transition. We are committed to helping mobilize and coordinate international

efforts underway to assist the parties with these negotiations. We must be

prepared to invest substantial political and diplomatic energy, as well as technical

assistance, to ensure that political will is fostered and agreements are not only

reached but also implemented. Only with sustainable arrangements will the parties

be able to navigate the many hurdles coming in 2011 and beyond.

Whether or not Southern Sudan becomes independent in July 2011, and regardless

of whether it includes Abyei or not, the Government of Southern Sudan will

require effective leadership as well as strengthened capacity to undertake effective

and accountable governance, provide security, and deliver services to its citizenry.

A robust, concerted international effort will be required to assist in this capacitybuilding

effort.

In order to assist in building up the capacity of Southern Sudan, we are undertaking

a ‘‘Juba Diplomatic Expansion’’ to include staffing and material assistance

on the ground in Sudan to support USG foreign policy objectives. Operating under

Chief of Mission authority, staff from the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

(S/CRS) and the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) will provide support to

Consulate General Juba and complement USAID’s robust presence in the run up to

and following Southern Sudan’s January 2011 referendum. Staff is assisting in strategic and contingency planning, program oversight, and technical assistance, both

in Washington and in the field.

In keeping with President Obama’s emphasis on multilateral efforts in Sudan, we

are working closely with our partners in the international community through the

Troika, Contact Group, and ‘‘E6’’ group of envoys. We have an ongoing dialogue with

key regional organizations and states, including the African Union, European

Union, Arab League, Sudan’s nine neighboring states, China, Russia, and others.

We also regularly engage with the United Nations on U.N. missions in Sudan. With

substantial U.S. input, the Security Council recently renewed the mandate of the

UNMIS peacekeeping mission, emphasizing the need for the mission to continue its

support to the CPA parties to implement all aspects of the CPA, and requesting that

UNMIS be prepared to assist the parties in the referenda process. Promising new

leadership on both Sudan peacekeeping missions bodes well for future mission operations.

The parties have much to do in the final phase of Sudan’s Interim Period

and it is our sincere hope that strong international engagement will further bolster

these efforts.

While much attention will be focused on the North-South process over the next

year, we continue to work on Darfur and the many important unresolved issues

there. A definitive end to conflict, gross human rights abuses, and genocide in

Darfur remains a key strategic objective, as made clear in the U.S. Strategy on

Sudan. Violence continues in and there are credible reports of continued aerial bombardments

by the Government of Sudan. This is unconscionable and we have called

on the government to immediately renew its cease-fire. Following progress in Chad-

Sudan relations earlier this year, the Darfur peace talks in Doha saw positive

progress with the signing of two framework agreements between the Government

of Sudan and Darfur rebels in February and March. We are concerned about the

Justice and Equality Movement’s decision to leave the peace talks and are encouraging

them to return to the negotiating table The U.N. and African Union are now

working hard to include the voices of civil society representatives in the process, implement

a cease-fire on the ground, and enter into meaningful and productive political

negotiations between the parties. While issues such as cease-fires, power-sharing,

and wealth-sharing can be addressed at a high level in Doha, we need to think

more creatively about how to bring the people of Darfur into local conversations

about compensation, land tenure, and rebuilding their communities. Additionally, as

stated in the U.S. Strategy on Sudan, accountability for genocide and atrocities is

necessary for reconciliation and lasting peace. In addition to supporting international

efforts to bring those responsible for genocide and war crimes in Darfur to

justice, we are consulting closely with our international partners and Darfuri civil

society on ways to strengthen locally owned accountability and reconciliation mechanisms

in light of the recommendations made by the African Union High Level Panel

on Darfur led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki.

Local peace building, rule of law, and reconciliation activities must be revived and

strengthened. We should not wait for a negotiated political settlement to begin improving

the lives of Darfuris. For instance, we are supporting the role of women in

peace building and working on the imperative of reducing gender-based violence in

Sudan. One of the administration’s highest priorities for Darfur is to improve security

so that the people on the ground who have suffered so greatly can see a tangible

improvement in their living conditions. We continue to work closely with UNAMID

and relevant stakeholders to enhance protection of civilians, expand humanitarian

space for the delivery of life-saving assistance, and consolidate gains in stable areas

to prepare for the voluntary return of people to their homes. This is not an easy

process, but it’s one international donors must undertake with great urgency. We

are also working with our international partners to improve access for UNAMID

and humanitarian workers to areas still affected by fighting between government

and rebel forces, such as Jebel Marra and Jebel Moon, as well as intertribal fighting,

especially in South Darfur. We are also working with the U.N. and other key

partners on a plan to provide increased security in the triangle that is formed by

El Fasher, Nyala, and El Geneina, where up to half the population of Darfur lives.

In the long term, it is imperative to address the underlying causes of conflict, including

disputes over land and water resources. This will require the cooperation

of the Government of Sudan, vigorous diplomacy by the United States, and sustained

support from the international community.

Yes, I do, sir.

I think we have to redouble our efforts. I think

the international community——

We are, sir.

I think it’s possible to get done everything we

have to get done, but we can’t waste another minute. The time is

now.

There’s three things that have to happen. The

first is that we have to take the lessons from the elections and turn

them into solutions for the referenda. There has to be better voter

education. There has to be a better system of logistics and procedures

and administration. And there have to be processes put in

place. And that means that the referendum commission has to be

appointed by the National Assembly. They have to be financed and

they have to be given the training.

I worry about the Diaspora registration. This registration will be

so complex—and it happens in July 9—that’s when it starts—

because they have to register people in countries outside, in 14 different

nations, and they don’t have the system of chiefs to do that.

And there’s sometimes not the requisite birth certificate and those

things to prove residency of the South. These are issues that have

to be resolved. And I’ll move quickly. But, we have to learn the lessons

and do the preparation. That means that ISIS, the international

monitoring teams, have to be on the ground right now,

working not as referees that throw in a red card, but as coaches

and folks that can help make this successful. Because if we’re not

successful in achieving a referenda that is credible from international

standards and represents the will of the people—and so,

they say, ‘‘Yes, my will has been acknowledged,’’ and that the

North can recognize that, I believe it’s going to be problematic.

Many of them do. But, the South has a very

important role, because it’s really—it’s a joint effort. And if it’s not

just a North issue and it’s not just a South issue; there’s got to be

a lot of work together. And the international community has to be

part of this, as does the regional partners in Africa.

Yes, sir. In my conversations with leaders in

the North, I believe they do. They recognize this has to take place.

But, I would also say the second and third aspects that we have

to do in the short term is, we have to get agreements on the post-

2011 issues of which oil revenue allocation is the most important

issue.

It’s got to be both. And they’ve set up an

agreement, where there’s three members of the South and three

members of the North and an executive committee. Those groups

are going to start talking. But, it has to happen as soon as possible,

because these are tough issues. And there’s other things that have

to happen, in terms of, maybe an audit and maybe some more technical——

They’ve asked the Norwegians, because of the

history that they’ve had with the oil, to help. They’ve also asked

us to help as technical advisers. And we’ve also been working with

Chatham House and other people to come up with some options for

them, looking at other wealth-sharing arrangements like with the

pipeline that goes from Chad to Cameroon, the TBC, and things

like that. So, we’ll continue to provide the technical advice.

But, now I believe it’s not any more time left for study. We have

to start making the negotiation, and we need to encourage both the

North and the South to do that as soon as possible.

The last issue you mentioned, though, is the border demarcation.

Without a clear boundary, it’s going to be very difficult for the

South to move on with independence. And so, we have to move very

quickly to get the President and the Presidential organization to

issue the report and then to start working out those areas where

there’s conflicts and start demarcating those areas where there’s

agreement. That has to happen—all these things have to happen

by November.

Yes, sir.

Very much so. But, we also need to have other

people step up to the plate. We’re not going to walk away from our

leadership and our commitment, but we have to have more people

join with us. And this would include the international community

and it would include members of Africa nations. It would also include

the U.N. And that’s why we’re reaching out in a very concerted

way to expand our team; not that we’re stepping away, but

to make sure that other people step up to the plate. And this

become an international issue to resolve, and not a U.S. issue to

fix.

The President has been superb and have given

me everything I’ve asked for. The Secretary of State, Secretary

Clinton, has just been marvelous—and her team.

Now, obviously, as we go into this period, if the South was to

choose independence, there are things that have to happen. And

we’re in consultations right now assessing the various options. And

certainly, we will be coordinating with the Congress, because there

are things that will, I believe, in the out years, require a change

in allocation of resources and the way we do business—in the

South especially, but also in the North.

That’s correct. If they choose unity, that’s

pretty easy. If they chose independence, I believe that there’s much

work that has to be done in the very near future.

That would be my assessment.

Yes. And in response to Senator Kerry, I just

listed those that are really make-or-breaks.

But, you’re exactly correct. We have been able

to work with the Sudanese in what we call our ‘‘trilateral talks,’’

to reach agreements on all aspects of the CPA. But, it really means

that other things have to happen. First of all, the national election

law has to be changed to give the South a blocking majority; an

extra 40 seats. And there’s other seats that have to be happening.

Right.

We expect it to happen somewhere the 1st, or

sometime after President Bashir is inaugurated.

The second thing that has to happen is that

we have to, as I said, do the border demarcation. And that’s—and

the popular consultations—and those are part of the CPA.

But, there’s a whole lot of issues on top of the CPA that are

looming. And things like, What happens to the citizens if they were

to choose independence? And we have to work through that. Things

like debt relief. Things like assets and liabilities. Whose currency

will we use? How do we establish the reserves? And we’re having

to work with the IMF and the World Bank on those issues. Things

like airspace control. Who’s going to—How do you do that transition

from the North, who now is responsible for air traffic control

and navaids, to moving that to the South?

So, sir, there’s a wide variety of issues that cross all aspects of

government that we’re going to have work through. So, my belief

is that there will be independence, but there will be a time where

these other functions are transitioned in a methodical and a safe

and a secure way to the South.

I would respond that, ultimately, it’s the

North and the South that have to meet agreements. They live

there. They’re going to live with—the longest border that they have

with any country is going to be between the North and the South,

should they choose independence. And they’re the primary actors

that have to reach agreements and implement.

The second tier are those neighbors, those nine countries that

live, bordering them.

And then, the third tier is the rest of Africa. And Africa should

be helping Africans. And that’s why we’re working very closely

with the Africa Union to make sure that they’re engaged and are

part of the solution.

Then there’s that tier of support and influence and leadership

that comes from the international community. And it stretches

from China and Russia, certainly Europe, but it also stretches to

Asia and South America. This is a global issue that requires an

international solution.

So, when I say, ‘‘we,’’ it’s in the very broadest terms. And while

the United States can’t own it, there’s leadership we can bring;

there’s resources and technical abilities that we can bring. But, certainly

we have to do this in concert and in a collective way with

all of our partners.

We’re committed to doing everything we can,

and everything we need to do, to do exactly that. And, in many

cases, we can have a leadership role that’s direct. Some places we

have to have an indirect role. And where we use influence and the

power that all of our government has in.

And this is where Congress can be very useful, too. You have an

opportunity to meet with people that come through the Senator

Foreign Relations Committee, and if we can work to elevate Sudan

in the inboxes of all these national leaders, that would be very useful. But, we have to continue to do that. And we have to continue

to use other partners to use influence.

But, you’re exactly right that there are certain areas that have

been carved out for the AU, for example, and the U.N. But, there’s

certain areas that we’re going to all have to jump in an fix. And

if the United States has to step up, certainly we want to make sure

that failure is not an option and success is what we achieve.

Well, we’ve had elections in the South, and

President Kiir, who runs the autonomous state of Southern Sudan,

and the Government of Southern Sudan will continue to have the

lead. And——

Yes, sir.

So, he would continue to have the lead, along

with his party, which is the SPLM, and the leaders in that party.

And they’ve already been posturing for this. They’ve already been

working out who is going to actually have the lead on these negotiations,

both with the IGAD and the AU and those things, but also

with the North.

And, historically, it’s been Riak Mashar who has been working

together with other partners. But, we’ll see, as they reorganize

their government, who will actually be the interface with the NCP.

We have a core group that comes out of the

State Department. And that’s around 20 now, with interns and

folks that we have on fellowships and that kind of thing. But, then

we’ve also been able to get help from other agencies who have seconded

people to us. And so, we run—people that are actually working

full time on Sudan—around 30—28 to 30. But, that number’s

going to go down in the summer, and some of the people that we

have for those fellowships may not get replaced.

But, the State Department is working through us. We’re working

very closely with Pat Kennedy. And I’ve got to tell you, my belief

is that we’re going to have the capacity that we need to do the job

that we must do.

Yes, sir.

Obviously, these are decisions that would have

to be made through the process—decision making process that goes

through the National Security Council. But, certainly we’ve been

very clear that we will not tolerate obstacles or roadblocks or messing

with the referenda. We believe that it needs to happen on time,

and we believe it needs to happen in a way that reflects the will

of the people. And so, rigging, messing with, or destabilizing would

be things that we would condemn. And there would be consequences

that are negative.

We believe, also, that when it comes to applying these pressures,

that if we can get a community of nations to work with us, that

these pressures will be more effective when the international community

is on board. And that’s why we’re working very hard to

make sure that the international community is seized with this

issue, that they also understand the importance of the referenda,

and that they are partners with us, so that when it comes time to

apply pressures, when it comes time to make sure that this

referenda goes forward, that it’s the whole international community

that brings pressure to bear on the North.

We are ready. These discussions take place in

the administration, in the National Security Council, and certainly

have been taking place in the State Department. Many of these

things, for obvious reasons, are things that we don’t talk about in

public. And we’d be very happy to come up here, as we have in the

past, to brief the staffs on the options that we have available,

should the scenarios warrant.

Well, obviously, what they want is to be unyoked

from sanctions, to get legitimacy, to move into the circle of

nations that are respected. And so, to take that away would be a

big thing. You know, in other words, to condemn, to further isolate,

to marginalize them would be something that I believe would have

a strong effect.

But, the range, beyond that, of things that we can do is great.

And they include things that we briefed with your staff. But, we

can give you more specifics on that.

This is a focus of our shop. We right now are

putting together a conflict mitigation package that looks at everything

from the ground level of sensing and figuring out where these

conflicts are, and then works all the way up through the top of the

government and the command-and-control system.

The deal is, is that, in many ways, we haven’t gotten out in front

of these things, because we don’t know that they’re happening until

they’ve happened. And so, our response has really been to take

note and to write a report. And that’s sort of what’s been happening

with our U.N. folks, the same. We want to be able to get

in front of these situations, to have a mobile and an agile force that

can get to these problems before they occur. And so, we’re working

on conflict mitigation teams, giving them the communications that

they need, giving them the mobility they need, and to try to get out

in front of these problems before they happen.

This is also something that we’re trying to do in Darfur. We’re

concentrating on an area between the three major cities that includes

Jebel Marra. But, conflict mitigation, increasing the security

mechanisms, and the infrastructure are primary things. Because,

if you look at all the problems that we have, we can’t do development,

we can’t do early returns, we can’t move on to governance,

we can’t put in place security—I mean, social infrastructure and

economic infrastructure, because of the insecurity. So, insecurity

and stability are high priority for this administration, and we’re

working on just that.

We were encouraged when the agreements

were made. And you’re exactly right that when we started, on the

15th of March of last year, we anticipated that we’d be able to

finalize the cease-fire and get agreements on power-sharing,

wealth-sharing, and compensation. This did not happen. And it’s

true that the JEM has walked away and has taken back to guns.

We understand that there has been some fighting going on in

eastern part of Darfur. We don’t know the details yet, because

UNAMID hasn’t been able to get out there to look at that. But,

we’ll keep an eye on that. And we certainly condemn any kind of

offensive action on either side. And we’ve said that publicly, and

we’ve said it privately. And we’ll continue to work with all of our

partners and the U.N. to make sure that this doesn’t continue. We

prefer a negotiated settlement that’s lasting. And we’re very disappointed

with this increase——

I believe that they have.

But we’re trying to get the extent of those.

What would happen is, if I could just explain a little bit, it’s our

understanding that when President Deby and other people made

an agreement with Khalil Ibrahim, the head of the JEM, that they

were supposed to stay in the area around Jebel Moon and in

camps. During the negotiations that have happened over the last

2 months, they have moved to the east and the—SAF, I believe, in

recent days, has retaliated against them.

But, again, we condemn this. We condemn all offensive action.

And we want them to go back to the table. We believe, on the 15th

of May, the Government of Sudan will come back to Doha, and we

hope, at that time, that Khalil Ibrahim will bring his team back

also.

Yes, sir. I believe we’re reaching that point.

For example, you’re exactly right that UNAMID was in a buildup

point, up until now. And now, we’re encouraging them to start

patrolling the roads; get out of the super camps, get out of the

three cities, and get out and start patrolling the roads between

Nyala and Fasher and El Geneina. And we believe that, just as

we’ve seen in the past, as they started patrolling between southern

Kordofan and Darfur, that taxis and transports and people started

following the security of the UNAMID vehicles. And the—we believe

that if they can get out—and then the NGOs—there’s 15,000

NGOs and people that are working on everything from stability to

early recovery to development, that are just hunkered down in the

three big cities. And we’ve got to get them out of the towns and

into where the people need some help. And I believe that, if

UNAMID can get out of the cities and start patrolling the roads,

that that will improve.

But, we also have to hold the Government of Sudan responsible.

In reality, it’s the government of the country that’s responsible for

its people. And I understand that that’s going to be difficult for a

while, but they also have to become part of the solution. And we’re

pushing them and working with them to make sure that they, too,

control the banditry, control the Janjaweed, and control those

things that they may have more control over than the UNAMID

forces. And if that all happens together, we may be successful. But,

it’s going to be an uphill battle.

It’s difficult to tell if they have. But, what has

happened is that the increase in banditry, carjacking, kidnappings,

and the basic unrest that is at the local level—not at the strategic

proxy-war level, but at the local level—has prevented people from

getting outside of the towns. And that’s why security and getting

rid of the banditry and the Janjaweed and the roadblocks is absolutely

what has to happen. And then, when that happens, maybe

the government can move on.

But, I will tell you, sir, what’s happened is that we’ve been able

to work through the ways that we’ve been able to cobble together—

and NGOs and the United Nations fill in the gap—we’ve been able

to work on food and health and sanitation and water. What we’re

missing is those things like gender-based violence, treatments,

mitigation. And there’s some aspects of the NGO expulsion that we

haven’t been able to restore. Those are the things we have to work

on, in this next phase, very hard to make sure that individuals feel

safe when they go out, and women are not put at risk of rape, and

that people have a system that, when they’re wronged, they can get

it righted through a system of justice and a rule of law and a pattern

of order. Those are the things that we have to get, because

while we’re making great strides, in terms of rebel unification and

Doha and the rapprochement, it has not changed the lives of the

people on the ground. They’re still living in dire conditions. They’re

still having gross human rights abuses, just because they don’t

have a way out. And this has to become a priority not only of the

United States, but of the Government of Sudan and the international

community.

No, it has started to decline. You’re right. And

even the number of deaths. And last year we dipped down to where

only 16, what we call, ‘‘excess deaths,’’ or deaths related to conflict.

But, the reality is, if there’s one, there’s too many.

And therefore, if there’s a single woman who’s

raped, that’s bad. And if there’s a single fatality, of a civilian that’s

caught up in this conflict, it’s unacceptable. And we’re going to

drive this to zero.

What’s happening is, the referenda has to be

completed 9—or 6 months prior to the end of the interim period.

So, technically—and now the South is asking for the referenda to

actually occur in the early part of December so that they can count

the votes and then make the announcement on the 9th. That’s a

little bit different than what we were aiming for before.

But, we’ll have to see how that progresses.

But, actually, January is the big date we’re driving for.

Of 2011, which could mean that independence

could come as early as the 9th of July, should the South choose

independence.

Yes, sir. As you remember, a year ago, the

Chadian rebels that were supported by the Government of Sudan

actually came within a half a mile of President Deby’s palace, and

the JEM got within 13 miles of Bashir’s. That situation has ended.

Assuming that it doesn’t start up again. But,

right now, President Deby’s doing the right things in Chad, and the

Government of Sudan is doing the right things with their Chadian

rebels. And I believe that’s not going to be an issue at the strategic

level anymore. But, at the tactical level, we’re having these things

that Senator Feingold talked about.

Thank you.

As I pointed out before, we did make great

gains to stop what could have been an absolute disaster. There was

1.2 million people at risk. We lost, in some places, 85 percent of

the capacity. That has come back.

The problem is, that because of the violence and the car jackings

and the banditry, it came back in a more centralized way in IDP

camps. And while the number—we really don’t know if it’s 2.0 or

2.7—there are still too many people in IDP camps. But, the problem

is, is that we’ve gone into a mode of sustained relief. And we’re

entering our 7th year of sustaining people with food and health

care and things. And it’s great we’re doing that. But, at some point,

we have to break that mold, and go into sustainable recovery and

development, where people get an opportunity to go back to their

lands, under Hakura, where they get to be able to have farms and

get herds again and move out and establish villages and homelands.

That has to change. And so, what’s happened is, is that we

did, but we consolidated, and we made it more of an institution. We

have to break out of that.

But, that ties in a little bit with gender-based violence. There’s

the institutions that have to change in Darfur. We have to make

it possible for women to be part of the police force. We have to

make it possible that they not only work on women’s programs, like

right now what we’re doing, collecting firewood and making that

easier, and solar—and all those are important things, but they

have to be integrated more into the society. And I believe that,

when those things happen, that some of these issues may decrease

even further.

But, in the short term, we have to provide, No. 1, a safety place

where women who have been violated can go and get the treatment

they need, where they can have the counseling that they need, and

where we support those kind of programs. And there have to be

NGOs that come in to develop those programs in a more widespread

way. That has been an area that I feel that we have not

been as successful as that we need to be.

So, building the short term, but then making the institutional

changes that give women a more prominent place and that give

them the respect and the tools that they need to become contributors

in a larger way.

In the short term, the U.N. forces—the U.N./

AU forces have to provide an umbrella of security—more than

they’re doing right now. In most areas, they don’t patrol past 10

o’clock at night. And they don’t patrol where the women have to

go out and collect firewood and those kinds of places. I believe, in

the short term, there has to be more security that’s put on there.

Those are things that we’re actually communicating

with the U.N. I just was up in New York, and I’ve been

talking with the U.N. commanders in the field. I was with them

on the 6th, just a couple days ago. And so—in Darfur, talking

about all these issues of how we raise security up. But, we’re going

to have to do a better job in putting security zones and then security

corridors where the folks do their seasonal migration. Those

things have to happen.

But, in addition to that, the Walis and the government have to

put in place systems of government where people who commit

crimes can be identified and that they’re brought to justice and incarcerated

or dealt with or punished or whatever that the system

of law does. Right now, the problem is, is that there’s not that sys-

tem. And so, when there’s crimes committed against women and

men, that there’s not a system that you can bring people to justice.

So, the local justice system, the whole accountability process—it

goes all the way back to 2003. Those are things that we’re working

with the international community, with the AU. And these have to

be put in place. And we’re already 7 years too late. And they have

to become a priority. And it’s a huge priority for me. I will continue

to raise it. It’s very important that we fix it, from a short-term relief,

but we actually make systematic changes that will ensure that

women are protected, that human rights are protected, and that

people can grow old with dignity.

And these are things that we just have to get to. And they—

we’ve put them aside too long as we’ve concentrated on food, water,

sanitation. But, we’ve got to go out and fix these things, because

it’s part of the soul, and that’s so very important.

Well, let me just go back and say that certainly

we respect Congressman Wolf’s participation, and we listened

very carefully to what he said.

I will also say that Secretary Clinton is certainly in control of the

policy of Sudan. I send her e-mails all the time. We have discussions

all the time. And she certainly is in charge, along with the

President, in what we do over there.

So—but, you’re right that we have a lot of work to do before July

2011. And the reason we’re behind is probably a little bit historical.

You know, we signed this agreement in 2005, but we really didn’t

get serious about reaching the final agreements on the 12 outstanding

issues until last year. Those—the agreements have been

reached, but we haven’t really finished the implementation.

So, we know, for example, in border demarcation—we made an

agreement that we would use the boundary that was present on

the 1st of January 1956. Now, the implementation piece is making

sure that we go and find, from archives, where that boundary was,

and, where there’s disagreements, that we work those things out.

And we’ve offered our technical expertise to help with that process.

There’s about 80 percent of it now that we’ve been able to

figure out. There are some areas where we’ll probably be able to

resolve relatively easily. And when I say ‘‘we,’’ it’s the team of

experts and both the North and the South.

They—yes, sir.

And the South, sure. Yes. It’s their country

and they’re the ones that have to agree on where that boundary

goes.

But, in many cases—and certainly in Abyei, there’s no question

where the boundary is. It was laid out very clearly at The Hague,

and it’s just a matter of demarcating it. So, there’s really no question

where the boundary is. It’s just a matter of sticking some

cement pylons in to let the people know where the boundary is.

We could have probably put some more effort

in earlier. But, the reality is, it really doesn’t matter. The reality

is, is that we’re here, today, where we are, and we have a very

tight timeline to get all these things accomplished. And that’s why

we’re calling on the parties, we’re calling on the Africans, and we’re

calling the international community to work together in a collective

way to resolve these problems, to meet the deadlines, so that we

can have a peaceful divorce, a civil divorce, instead of a civil war.

That’s our goal.

No, it isn’t.

That’s exactly why we say we would like to

have this boundary demarcated by November, so that it is not an

issue as they reach a vote.

I anticipate that that is the end—that’s when

we’d like to get it done by. But, I believe that if we work together—

this is a long boundary, and there are some issues, especially up

around oil, that may be contentious. And so, we will provide whatever

support we can. But, we believe that if it is done by November,

then it is not an issue that will be factored into the referendum.

If, for some reason, we can’t get this thing demarcated

until after the referendum, we believe it will be a problem, in

terms of independence.

I’ve talked to him, and I believe he does.

President Kiir and I have discussed all the

issues that have to be done. And we’ve—share the same views on

the things that have to be done before they move forward with a

referendum. And I’m not sure I understand you question, but——

He was elected in an area that does not have

formal boundaries. You know, we know sort of where the states

are, but—the border between the North and the South that follows

the 1956 is not going to be the border that exists today. There’s

areas in Darfur where the border will move. And there’s areas

around Hegleig where the border will move to reflect that 1/1/56

agreement. So, in other words, the state borders that exist today

will not be the final border.

I think Secretary Rice is already working

with—in her job as Ambassador in the U.N.—to highlight these

issues. She’s called for hearings. She’s working the issue very hard,

and we’re in constant communication.

Secretary Clinton has been superb and continues to help in every

way she can to raise this level. She has been coordinating with

other Foreign Ministers of the Troika. We’ve put out joint statements.

And she’s been extremely positive and helpful, and as has

the President.

Obviously, there’s more things that can be done. And we’re working

with her staff and her people to elevate these issues as they

come up. But, I have no complaints about the level of effort that

people above me are putting into it.

Yes, sir. You’ve just really hit the nail on the

head, as we think about development. Out of the last 100 years,

19 years out of the last 25 have been the worst, in terms of rainfall.

So, what I’m trying to say is, in—that the last 25 years have been

far less rain that’s fallen on Darfur. The water tables have dropped

2 meters in recent years. The competition, not only for water, is

terrible. And the desertification is definitely moving South.

In addition to that, Sudan has cut down more trees than any

other country in Africa. And Darfur is actually the worst place for

that. In fact, there’s—only Brazil and Indonesia exceed them in

hectares; 8.8 million hectares destroyed in Sudan. And so, these

issues, the fact that the trees have been cut down, the fact that

we’re just having less rain, is putting tremendous pressure on

these populations. And as we think about the future, we’ve got to

tackle these issues. And you’re exactly correct. I would like to see

the people, in their spare time—soldiers—out there planting trees

and working on these things. We did it in Ethiopia, and we saw

the water tables come up, as when it does rain, these grasses and

trees are able to grab the water and hold them, instead of runoff.

So, you hit on a problem that is near to me. I’ve raised it with

Vice President Taha. I’ve discussed it with Mutrif, in the Foreign

Ministry. I discussed it with the leadership of UNAMID. And I’ve

discussed it throughout. I am dedicated to not only bringing the

security, but working the long-term answers for Darfur, and they

include acknowledging the climate change and fixing them.

They’ve actually changed the law. There’s

already a law that was put in place in December that allows the

referendum to take place. What needs to be done is that they

have—the National Assembly has to approve the Southern Sudan

Referendum Commission, and then they also have to appoint the

Abyei Referendum Commission. But, the law has been changed—

I mean the law was put in place to allow this commission——

We anticipate it will be done sometime after

the 25th, probably around the 1st of June.

Yes, I had a meeting 2 weeks ago with Mikhail

Margelov, and we’ve—we talk, and certainly we’re looking at seeing

if—what the relationship could be of Russia to Sudan, because they

have access that we don’t have, they have capabilities that we don’t

have. And we’re looking right now and figuring out a way that we

could team together to do just that.

I think it’s clear, in my discussions with them,

that they would like to move to a position where the government

would be more respected and more accepted by the international

society.

That is accurate, because of the banditry and

the roadblocks and things that are going on. That’s very true.

I take your point, and I certainly will raise

those at the appropriate level.

I would like to clarify one thing. I misunderstood your question.

It is true that we’re meeting the needs of the people in IDP camps.

What is not true is that we’re able to get out in the countryside,

where a lot of the Arabs, nomads, are. And so, there’s a population

that is not being met. But, in many ways, those were not being met

before the NGOs got pushed out. So, I apologize. I misunderstood——